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The  aim  is  to  analyse  the  efﬁciency  of the board  of  directors  as  a  corporate  governance  mechanism.  For
this  purpose,  we examine  the  effect  of board  composition,  size,  activity,  leadership  structure  and  CEO
tenure  on ﬁrm  performance.  To  test  our hypothesis  we  use  a  sample  of 307  Spanish  SMEs,  none  of  which
is  listed.  Our  main  empirical  result  is the  negative  impact  of  the  outside  directors  proportion  and  board
size on ﬁrm  performance.  The  presence  of  outside  directors  can be  said  not  to have  resulted  in improved
ﬁrm  performance.  Despite  the  greater  monitoring,  advising  and  networking  capacity  attributed  to  outside
directors,  the ﬁrms  in  the  sample  showed  a signiﬁcant  presence  of  insider  directors,  an  aspect  that  may  be
related  to their  greater  knowledge  of  the  ﬁrm,  with  a subsequently  positive  effect  on  strategic  planning
decisions.  The  negative  effect  of  board  size  could  indicate  that  the  disadvantages  of  worse  coordination,
ﬂexibility  and  communication  inside  large  boards  seem  to be  more  important  than  the  beneﬁts  of better
manager  control  by  the  board  of directors.
©  2012  AEDEM.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All rights  reserved.
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El  objetivo  es  analizar  la  eﬁciencia  del consejo  de administración  como  mecanismo  de  gobierno  cor-
porativo.  Para  ello,  analizamos  el  efecto  de  su composición,  taman˜o,  actividad,  estructura  de  liderazgo
y mandato  del  máximo  ejecutivo  sobre  los resultados  empresariales.  Para  contrastar  las  hipótesis  uti-
lizamos  una  muestra  de  307  PYMEs  espan˜olas,  ninguna  de  las  cuales  cotiza  en Bolsa.  Nuestro  principal
resultado  es  el efecto  negativo  de la  proporción  de  consejeros  externos  y taman˜o  del  consejo  sobre  los
resultados  empresariales.  Se  puede  decir  que la  presencia  de  consejeros  externos  no  se traduce  en  la
mejora  de los  resultados  de  la empresa.  A  pesar  de  la mayor  capacidad  de  control,  asesoramiento  yandato del CEO creación  de redes  atribuida  a los  externos,  las empresas  de  la muestra  presentan  una signiﬁcativa  pres-
encia  de  consejeros  internos,  aspecto  que  puede  estar  relacionado  con  su mayor  conocimiento  de  la
empresa,  con  el consiguiente  efecto  positivo  en las  decisiones  estratégicas  de  la  misma.  El efecto  neg-
ativo  del  taman˜o  del  consejo  puede  indicar  que  las desventajas  de  la  peor  coordinación,  ﬂexibilidad  y
comunicación  dentro  de los  consejos  de  gran  taman˜o,  parecen  ser  más  importantes  que  los beneﬁcios
derivados  del  mayor  control  gerencial  por  parte del  consejo.
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1. Introduction
The efﬁciency of corporate board as a central institution in the
internal governance of a company and its impact on ﬁrm behaviour
is one of the most debated issues in literature today. Literature on
boards focuses on three main questions (John & Senbet, 1998): the
size of the board (Barroso Castro, Villegas Perin˜an, & Pérez-Calero,
2010; De Andrés, Azofra, & López, 2005; Eisenberg, Sundgren
and Wells, 1998; García-Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010; Jackling
& Johl, 2009; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996); its composition and
ts reserved.
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ndependence (Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2010; Barroso Castro
t al., 2010; Bhagat & Black, 2000; De Andrés et al., 2005; García-
lalla & García-Ramos, 2010; Jackling & Johl, 2009; Lefort & Urzúa,
008); and its internal structure and functioning (De Andrés et al.,
005; García-Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010; Jackling & Johl, 2009;
lein, 1998; Vafeas, 1999).
This paper adds to this empirical literature by analysing the
nﬂuence of the board activity (number of meetings), leadership
tructure and CEO tenure as well as the size of the board and its
omposition on ﬁrm performance. Besides, in the context of non-
isted ﬁrms, this paper studies speciﬁcally the efﬁciency of board
f director in small and medium-sized ﬁrms.
Most research on corporate governance and boards has focused
heoretically and empirically on large corporations (Daily, Dalton,
 Canella, 2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004). However, the literature
dentiﬁes both differences and similarities in corporate governance
nd boards in large and small ﬁrms (Machold, Huse, Minichilli, &
ordqvist, 2011). While agency problems are also relevant to the
mall ﬁrm context, decision-making and control structures here
re less complex and diffuse compared to large ﬁrms resulting
n a comparatively diminished boards’ monitoring role (Daily &
alton, 1993; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Owners of small ﬁrms may
e more concerned about ﬁrm survival, growth rate, family wel-
are, succession plan, personal status, etc. than retaining short-term
nancial returns that are a core concern of shareholders in pub-
ic companies. The different focuses of interests may  affect how
oards perform their tasks (Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007). The type
nd content of boards’ tasks also vary between small and large
rms (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Effective governance of small ﬁrms
lso depends on the ﬁrm’s capability of tapping board knowledge
Pugliese & Wenstøp, 2007). Finally, the impact of founders and/or
ey entrepreneurs on boards and governance may  be greater in
mall ﬁrms compared to large ones (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson,
 Johnson, 2009).
We  conducted, following Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand (1996),
n integrated analysis of three functions of the board of directors,
upervisory, advisory and networking with particular emphasis on
he impact that its structure, composition and size has on ﬁrm per-
ormance. Our main empirical result is the negative impact of the
utside directors proportion and board size on ﬁrm performance.
he presence of outside directors can be said not to have resulted in
mproved ﬁrm performance. Despite the greater monitoring, advis-
ng and networking capacity attributed to outside directors, the
rms in the sample showed a signiﬁcant presence of insider direc-
ors, an aspect that may  be related to their greater knowledge of
he ﬁrm, with a subsequently positive effect on strategic planning
ecisions. The negative effect of board size indicate that the dis-
dvantages of worse coordination, ﬂexibility and communication
nside large boards seem to be more important than the beneﬁts of
etter manager control by the board of directors.
In that context, the rest of the paper is organised as follows.
ection 2 describes the theoretical basis and the hypotheses to
xamine. Section 3 sets out the data and procedures for analysis
sed in undertaking this empirical study. The main results of the
nvestigation and their discussion are presented in Section 4. We
onclude the paper in Section 5 with some conclusions and implica-
ions for management theory and practice, as well as the limitations
f the investigation. The paper ends with a list of bibliographical
eferences.
. Theoretical background and hypothesesIn recent years the attention and interest in corporate gover-
ance structures has grown signiﬁcantly in management literature,
specially after the ﬁnancial corporate collapses happened around y Economía de la Empresa 19 (2013) 127–135
the world. Various published Codes of good governance have made
recommendations on the size of the board, its composition, and the
internal or external character of its directors. The aim is to establish
effective control over the management of the ﬁrm by the board of
directors and its responsibility for the ﬁrm and the shareholders.
However, governance studies have focused on large public ﬁrms
instead in private small and medium sized ﬁrms (SMEs).
The interest of SMEs’ researchers has been concentrated on the
need to identify the existence of governance mechanisms to guar-
antee the survival of SMEs.
This paper focuses on the link between ﬁrm performance and
several corporate governance issues such as the composition of the
board, its size, its activity, its leadership and its tenure in non-listed
SMEs.
2.1. Board composition
Among the different dimensions of board of directors, board
composition is one of the most debated issues for the majority of
research efforts on boards. Studies on board composition classify
directors as either insiders (those who  are directors and managers
at the same time) or outsiders (non-manager directors), since they
can have quite different behaviour and incentives (De Andrés et al.,
2005). Most of the corporate governance codes developed at the
country level an international level (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act in US,
Combined Code in UK, Conthe Code in Spain, OECD Code) require
boards of directors to have a combination of inside and outside
directors.
In the context of corporate governance, agency theory implies
that adequate monitoring mechanisms need to be established to
protect shareholders from management’s self-interests and out-
side directors are supposed to be guardians of the shareholders’
interests via monitoring. Therefore a high proportion of outside
directors on the board could have a positive impact on performance
by monitoring services (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny,
1997). Support for the agency theory, scholars has suggested alter-
native explanations for the determinants of board composition. So,
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Raheja (2005), Harris and Raviv
(2008), and Adams and Ferreira (2007), model the theoretical deter-
minants of board composition, speciﬁcally the roles of insiders
and outsiders (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). For example, Raheja
(2005) argues that insiders are an important source of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information for the board and their experience can improve ﬁrm
performance, but they can have distorted objectives due to private
beneﬁts and lack of independence from the CEO. Compared to insid-
ers, outsiders provide superior ﬁrm performance as a result of their
more independent monitoring, but are less informed about the
ﬁrm’s constraints and opportunities. A growing body of research
suggests that a strong and vigilant board of directors can have a sig-
niﬁcant positive inﬂuence on the value-creating potential of SMEs
by favouring change and innovation in strategic decision-making
(Gabrielsson, 2007a). In small ﬁrms there may  be problems with
inconsistent information between managers and shareholders due
to vague divisions of responsibilities and the absence of formal
reporting systems. Also, the markets for corporate and managerial
control may  function less well in these kind of ﬁrms (Gabrielsson &
Winlund, 2000). Medium-size companies can be expected to ben-
eﬁt from the external supervision that a governing board can offer,
for example by providing attention to critical issues facing the com-
pany and directing the company towards appropriate competitive
strategies by allocating resources to innovative projects and pro-
cedures necessary for responding to changes in the marketplace
(Gabrielsson, 2007a). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) support the
argument that outside directors are more effective monitors and a
critical disciplining device for managers but they posit no signiﬁ-
cant relationship between performance and outsiders’ proportion
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n the board of directors. From an agency theory perspective, the
oard can be used as a monitoring device for shareholder interests
o safeguard their investments (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and the board
f directors can function as an exceptionally relevant information
ystem for stakeholders to monitor executive behaviour and ﬁrm
erformance (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000).
Besides agency theory, several other theoretical perspectives
ave been used in order to explain board roles and the compo-
ition of the board of directors. The service role can be related to
he resource based view and resource dependence theory, where
oards are considered to control interorganizational dependencies
nd act as a strategic resource for securing critical resources for the
rm (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). According to resource
ased theory, a ﬁrm’s internal environment, its resources and capa-
ilities, is critical for creating sustainable competitive advantage
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Knowledge is an intangible resource
hat can sustain a competitive advantage in the long term and one
ay to enhance its acquisition is involvement in ﬁrm ownership.
mall ﬁrms are however generally characterized by a lack of inter-
al resources, and in-house knowledge may  in many cases be scarce
r non-existing (Storey, 1994). It becomes very important the advi-
ory role of the board (Daily & Dalton, 1993), as they can provide
omprehensive and complementary outside knowledge that can
e used by the management team in formulating and implemen-
ing their strategies (García-Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010; Machold
t al., 2011). The appearance of outside directors on the board of
mall private ﬁrms will reﬂect the service and resource needs of
he CEO rather than the control role (Fiegener, Brown, Dreux, &
ennis, 2000). Thus, the knowledge and skills of outside directors
ay complement, or compensate for, those of managers and inter-
al directors (Huse, 1990). The service role is therefore linked to
he board’s giving of advice and to the board’s work in legitimiz-
ng the ﬁrm and providing it with important strategic networks
Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000).
According resource dependence theory, outsiders seen as a link-
ng mechanism between the ﬁrm and its environment that may
upport the managers in the achievement of the various goals of
he organization (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra & Pearce,
989). These directors are known and powerful persons that take
roﬁt of their personal networks in order to increase the legiti-
acy, the reputation and the stock of resources controlled by the
ompany (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A critical factor
f growth within SME  is the access to external ﬁnancing sources,
nd these ﬁrms tend to have fewer alternatives for managing their
esource dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Therefore, the
oard’s resource dependence role may  take on added importance
n these ﬁrms (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Pfeffer, 1973). Also, outside
irectors can be an effective means for overcoming the human
esource limitations that often plague small ﬁrms (Daily & Dalton,
993; Huse, 1990).
Outside directors increases supervision, introduces indepen-
ent considerations in decision-making, and increases knowledge
bout the business. Accordingly the following hypothesis is pre-
ented.
1. The proportion of outside directors of SMEs is positively asso-
iated with ﬁrm performance.
.2. Size of the board
One of the most analysed variables in the study of corporate
overnance is the size of the board. It is not clear the effect of the
ize of the board on ﬁrm performance (Barroso Castro et al., 2010;
ennedsen, Kongste, & Nielsen, 2008).
A board of directors with high levels of links to the exter-
al environment would improve a company’s access to various y Economía de la Empresa 19 (2013) 127–135 129
resources thus improving corporate governance and ﬁrm per-
formance. Surveys of board practices have reported that small
companies have relatively few directors on their board, ranging
between three and seven members and that in addition to the
founder or owner–manager, there may  be one or two family mem-
bers on the board (Gabrielsson, 2007b). There has been some
empirical evidence to suggest that increased board size can have
a positive association with performance (Forbes & Milliken, 1999;
Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Van den Berghe & Levrau,
2004). Proponents of this view argue that a larger board will bring
together a greater depth of intellectual knowledge and therefore
improve the quality of strategic decisions that ultimately impact
on performance. Besides, incorporating the advisory role in the
analysis, an additional director brings more human capital to the
company, increasing board information and speciﬁc knowledge
about the business. This contributes to the efﬁciency of the advisory
role and therefore, to better ﬁrm performance (Adams & Ferreira,
2007; De Andrés & Rodríguez, 2008; Linck et al., 2008).
However, while the abilities of the board can increase as more
directors are added, the beneﬁts can be outweighed by the costs in
terms of the poorer communication and decision-making associ-
ated with larger groups (Cheng, 2008). According to Jensen (1993),
large corporate boards may  be less efﬁcient due to difﬁculties in
solving the agency problem among the members of the board. As
groups increase in size they become less effective because the coor-
dination and process problems overwhelm the advantages from
having more people to draw on. Yermack (1996) presents evidence
that small boards of directors are more effective and that ﬁrms
achieve higher market value. For instance, some authors show an
inverse relationship between ﬁrm value and the size of the board
(Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996).
Thus, the effect of board size on ﬁrm performance is a trade-off
between beneﬁts and drawbacks (García-Olalla & García-Ramos,
2010). In this sense, we  expect a non-linear relationship between
the size of the board and ﬁrm performance. Our second hypothesis
states the following hypothesis.
H2. There will be an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the
size of the board and ﬁrm performance for SMEs.
2.3. Board internal structure
2.3.1. Board activity
One aspect in relation with the board internal structure is board
activity. Following Jackling and Johl (2009), one way to measure
the board activity, is the frequency of board meetings. The meet-
ings frequency can be a factor that helps us to assess whether the
board of directors is an active or a passive board. Board meetings
must be held frequently enough to let the board get continuous
reports concerning the ﬁrm’s situation (Gabrielsson & Winlund,
2000). The frequency of the board’s meetings can offer information
on the importance attributed to it, since the greater number of
meetings, the more information is offered to the others and there
are more issues to decide on the board. The meetings are the most
usual occasion to discuss and exchange ideas in order to monitor
managers (Conger, Finegold, & Lawler, 1998). From this point
of view, the more frequent the meetings, the more detailed the
control of the managers, and the greater the shareholder wealth.
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that the greater frequency of
meetings is positively associated with performance. The board
cannot be expected to monitor ﬁrm performance if they are not
given the opportunity to do this (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000).An opposing view professed by Jensen (1993) is that routine
tasks absorb much of a board’s meeting time and thus limit the
opportunities for outside directors to exercise meaningful control
over management (Jackling & Johl, 2009). Given that the CEO is
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harged with ﬁxing the agenda of the meeting, that the time of the
utsider directors is scarce and that routine tasks take up a large
roportion of the time, more meetings do not necessarily imply bet-
er monitoring (De Andrés et al., 2005). Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
uggest that the most widely shared problem directors face is lack
f time to carry out their duties. However, some evidence suggests
hat the association between number of meetings and performance
s more complex than previously reported (Vafeas, 1999). It would
e interesting to include questions related to the “quality of meet-
ngs” such as to what extent are meetings used for routine tasks as
pposed to time devoted to substantive issues.
Previous studies in ﬁrms with a concentrated ownership struc-
ure conﬁrm the existence of proactive boards in companies, so
hat increased activity in its roles of supervision and advice is sup-
orted by favourable results of the ﬁrm performance (De Andrés &
odríguez, 2008; García-Olalla & García-Ramos, 2010).
According to these arguments and following also Jackling and
ohl (2009), we propose the third hypothesis.
3. There is a positive association between board activity (in
erms of meeting frequency) and ﬁrm performance for SMEs.
.3.2. Board leadership
Another aspect to deal with when analyzing the board struc-
ure is the coincidence in the same person of the ﬁgures of the
hairman and chief executive. Prior literature acknowledges that
he type of board leadership and role of the Chief Executive Ofﬁ-
er (CEO) can have an inﬂuence on ﬁrm performance. A substantial
ody of research has focused on the association between ﬁrm per-
ormance and CEO leadership (Daily, McDougall, Covin, & Dalton,
002; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). The empirical evi-
ence is no conclusive on CEO duality, and several studies even ﬁnd
o signiﬁcant effect on ﬁrm performance (Braun & Sharma, 2007).
García-Olalla and García-Ramos (2010,p. 8) argue that “from
he perspective of the advisory function, the presence of the CEO
n the board may  have a positive effect on ﬁrm performance,
s he/she has speciﬁc knowledge about the company, its strate-
ic direction, its investment opportunities etc., so he/she can help
o optimize decision-making”. Besides, advocates of stewardship
heory argue that authoritative decision-making under the lead-
rship of a single individual (as both chairman and CEO) leads to
igher ﬁrm performance (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). CEO duality
liminates confusion and conﬂict between the CEO and chairman
nd thus allows for smoother, more effective and consistent strate-
ic decision-making and implementation (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao,
996; Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Chahine & Tohmé, 2009;
arris & Helfat, 1998). Boyd (1995) discusses the notion of steward-
hip behaviour, in which the CEO is concerned with doing the job
ight and effectively guiding the ﬁrm. He argues that dual structure
eadership might consequently have a positive effect on ﬁrm value
n environments or conditions characterized by scarce resources
nd high complexity, such as in the context of emerging markets
Chahine & Tohmé, 2009).
Small ﬁrms differ from the large ones in several important ways,
ncluding more concentrated ownership structures and role inte-
ration, making CEO duality a much more common phenomenon
n the small business setting (Machold et al., 2011). In small ﬁrms,
he CEO and board chairperson position is usually held by one per-
on. This practice has drawn many criticisms according to agency
heory (Pugliese and Wenstøp, 2007).
However, agency theoretic arguments imply a separation of
he two positions (Coles & Hesterly, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983;
inkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The argu-
ent behind the need for a separation of the CEO and board
hairperson roles is that the board of directors is expected to moni-
or the actions of top management and evaluate their performance y Economía de la Empresa 19 (2013) 127–135
(Gabrielsson, Huse, & Minichilli, 2007). Such a powerful CEO may  be
driven by self-interest, and unless restricted from doing otherwise,
will undertake self-serving activities that could be detrimental to
the economic welfare of the principals (Deegan, 2006; Rashid &
Lodh, 2011). A centralized leadership authority may  thus lead to
management’s domination of the board, which results in poor per-
formance (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer
& Vishny, 1997). In SMEs the independent leadership structure may
lead to a power balance between the CEO and chair of the board may
enhance the ﬁrm performance (Rashid & Lodh, 2011).
According to these arguments the relationship between CEO
duality and ﬁrm performance is expected to be negative (Chahine
& Tohmé, 2009; Chen & Jaggi, 2000).
Besides, the existing Codes of good governance clearly do not
favour a particular position and, although they suggest the differ-
entiation of the two positions, they led the decision on the ﬁrm.
According to these arguments and following also Jackling and Johl
(2009), we propose the next hypothesis.
H4. There is a positive association between the separation of the
ﬁgures of CEO and chairman and ﬁrm performance for SMEs.
2.3.3. CEO tenure
The Resource Based View (Barney, 1991; Hillman, Cannella, &
Paetzold, 2000) suggests board members are resources for the ﬁrm,
and will be regarded as being of greater or lesser value in view of
their own  competence, knowledge, or experience (Barney, 1991).
A long tenure on a board brings with it positive aspects. Longer
CEO tenure could suggest a long-term commitment to the ﬁrm.
Longer tenures facilitate lengthy investment time horizons and
provide investment incentives and stewardship (Le Breton-Miller
& Miller, 2006). Knowing the average tenure of the CEO may  be
helpful to know the possibility of the existence of a situation of
convergence of interests or entrenchment by the CEO.
However, along with these positive connotations, more signif-
icantly, negative aspects can appear (Barroso Castro et al., 2010).
In this respect some studies suggest that long tenures are associ-
ated with a higher resistance to change (Musteen, Barker, & Baeten,
2006). Golden and Zajac (2001) suggest that extended tenure of
board members is associated with a greater rigidity, and can result
in trenching behind existing practices and procedures, with direc-
tors distancing themselves from new ideas. Moreover, according
to Vafeas (2003), board members who  serve longer on the board
and who  therefore have greater experience are more likely to form
friendships and less likely to supervise the management. The infor-
mation about the CEO tenure would serve to know if the rotation is
relatively common, which gives a notion of efﬁciency in the func-
tioning of the board of directors. Having established a relatively
short tenures, should help to increase the capacity for monitoring
of this body, because of the rotation promotes the appearance of
new people and, therefore, different attitudes and views on certain
situations or decisions.
In this context, the following hypothesis is proposed.
H5. There is a negative association between the length of the
tenure of the CEO and ﬁrm performance for non-listed SMEs.
3. Empirical research: method, data and analysis
3.1. Population and sample
We  conducted this study on Spanish ﬁrms included in the
SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System) database for 2006.
We imposed certain restrictions on this group of companies
in order to reach a representative set of the population. First,
we eliminated companies affected by special situations such
as insolvency, winding-up, liquidation or zero activity. Second,
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estrictions concerning the legal form of companies were imposed:
e focused on limited companies and private limited companies as
hey have a legal obligation to establish boards of directors. Third,
e eliminated listed companies. Fourth, we studied only Spanish
rms that had between 50 and 250 employees, i.e., companies
arge enough to ensure the existence of a suitable management
eam and a controlling board to monitor their performance. Finally,
ompanies were required to have provided ﬁnancial information in
006. With this condition, the sample under study comprised 2958
on-listed Spanish SMEs that had, according to SABI database,
etween 50 and 250 employees. We  based our deﬁnition of
ME  on the ofﬁcial EU deﬁnition (European Union, 2003) whilst
sing a lower limit of 50 employees to exclude ﬁrms without a
ell-established board of directors.
.2. Data
Data were collected by means of telephone interviews, a method
hat ensures a high response rate, and ﬁnancial reporting informa-
ion was obtained from the SABI database. To guarantee the highest
ossible number of replies, managers were made aware of the study
n advance by means of a letter indicating the purpose and impor-
ance of the research. In cases where they were reluctant to reply
r made excuses, a date and time were arranged in advance for the
elephone interview. The ﬁnal response rate was approximately
0.4%, and the interviewees were persons responsible for manage-
ent at the ﬁrms (ﬁnancial managers in 56.48% of the cases, the
EO in 31.06%, the president in 1.54% of the cases, and others in
0.92%).
The questionnaire collects information on the variables required
or the study that could not be obtained from the SABI database and
hich it was considered would be more reliably collected through
 survey; in particular, information regarding the ownership struc-
ure and composition of the board and company management.
.3. Deﬁnition of variables
Firm proﬁtability: The ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, measured in terms
f return on assets (ROA), was taken as a dependant variable. The
OA measures the capacity of a ﬁrm’s assets to generate proﬁts and
t is considered to be a key factor in determining the form’s future
nvestment. It is therefore used as an indicator of ﬁrm proﬁtability.
The ROA has been deﬁned as EBIT (earnings before interests
nd taxes) between total assets, not taking into account the ﬁrm’s
nancial performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). EBIT is a tradi-
ional measurement which does not include capital costs, i.e., it
nly includes the operating margin and operating income.
Board composition:  Theoretically, from an agency perspective,
t is claimed that a greater proportion of outside directors on boards
ct to monitor independently in situations where a conﬂict of inter-
st arises between the shareholders and managers. Agency theory
s based on the premise that there is an inherent conﬂict between
he interests of a ﬁrm’s owners and its management (Fama & Jensen,
983).
A high proportion of outside directors on the board is there-
ore viewed as potentially having a positive impact on performance
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny,
997). A greater proportion of outside directors will monitor any
elf-interested actions by managers, and will therefore be associ-
ted with high corporate performance (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007).
This variable has been generated representing the composition
f the board (OUTSIDERS), calculated as the percentage of exter-
al directors on the board (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini &
aprio, 2006). The function of this variable is to measure the board’s
onitoring capacity, in order to analyse its inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s
roﬁtability. y Economía de la Empresa 19 (2013) 127–135 131
Board size (BOARDSIZE) is measured using the natural log-
arithm of total number of members of the board of directors
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; De Andrés et al., 2005; Jackling & Johl,
2009).
Board activity (MEET) is measured in terms of number of board
meetings held in a reporting year. This is an interesting variable
since it can be used as a proxy for the intensity of board activity.
Leadership (DUALITY) is measured as a dummy  variable which
takes value 1 if the chairman and the CEO are the same person and
0 otherwise.
CEO tenure (TENURE) is measured in terms of the average num-
ber of years of the tenure. Tenure can take four values: value 1 if
the tenure is less than 4.5 years; value 2 if the tenure is between
4.5 and 10 years; and value 3 if the tenure is longer than 10 years.
Control variables:  Firm size (SIZE) was measured using the nat-
ural logarithm of total assets (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini &
Caprio, 2006; Wang, 2006).
The number of directors is a relevant feature that can have much
to do with the board’s monitoring and control activity. Whereas the
ability of the board to monitor can increase as more directors are
added, the beneﬁts can be outweighed by the costs in terms of the
poorer communication and decision-making associated with larger
groups (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).
On the above basis and given the potential importance of board
size, we also created a variable measured using the natural loga-
rithm of the number of directors in the ﬁrms in the sample.
Growth opportunities (GROWTHOP), following Scherr and
Hulburt (2001) were calculated as Sales0/Sales−1. In this case, ﬁrms
that grew most in the past were considered to have most chance of
growth in the future.
Borrowing level (LEV) was  measured as the quotient between
total debt and total assets (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2005; Wang,
2006).
Firm age (AGE) was measured as the natural logarithm of the
number of years since the ﬁrm was  incorporated.
The sector (SECT) was measured by means of dummy variables,
using the standard industrial classiﬁcation.
3.4. Method
We apply a cross-sectional ordinary least-square (OLS) regres-
sion model to test the hypotheses presented in the preceding
section. Drawing on previous research on corporate governance,
we also include ﬁve control variables to minimize speciﬁcation bias
in the hypothesis testing.
After testing the ﬁrst version of the model, which includes just
the outsiders variable, we  do seven more regressions to take into
account the composition of the board and its functioning. Con-
trol variables were added to the right hand side of the equation
including. In the ﬁrst six regressions we analyse the effect of each
variables, board composition, board size, board leadership, board
activity and CEO tenure on ﬁrm performance. The last two  regres-
sions reﬂect the impact of all variables on ﬁrm performance.
The study expects a positive association between board com-
position (outsiders) and performance, anticipating that ﬁrms with
a greater proportion of outside directors have better performance.
Also, the coefﬁcient of leadership is expected to be negative, sig-
nifying that higher agency costs in the case of dual leadership and
CEO. We expect a non-linear relation of board size, which indicates
that there is an optimum level of board members. Beyond a number
of members, the inefﬁciencies outweigh the advantages. For board
activity, a positive relationship is expected for number of meet-
ings (meet) and ﬁrm performance based on resource dependency
theory. A negative relationship is also expected for the director’s
tenure and ﬁrm performance.
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics of sample ﬁrms: mean and standard deviation values for vari-
able measures.
Mean S.D.
Number of observations 307
ROA (%) 7.46 7.68
Board of director’s composition
(Outsiders %)
61.83 27.71
Leadership (% ﬁrms where the
chairman and the CEO is the
same person)
41.00 49.09
Meet 5.12 4.24
Board size 5.78 2.95
Tenure >10
Growth opportunity
(Sales0/Sales−1) (%)
4.56 4.62
Leverage (Total Debt/Total 61.39 17.79
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Firm’s size (Total Assets) 43,493.66 110,363.2
Firm’s age (years) 38.28 24.41
To test for multicollinearity, the VIF was calculated for each
ndependent variable. Myers (1990) suggests that a VIF value of
0 and above is cause for concern. The results (not shown in this
aper) indicate that all the independent variables had VIF values of
ess than 10.
. Results and discussion
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in
he analysis. We  show mean and standard deviation values
or the ﬁrms in the sample. The results show that, on average there
re 61.83% of outside directors on the board. In relation to the lead-
rship structure, in the 41% of the ﬁrms in the sample, both the
gures of Chairman and CEO are the same person. In terms of board
ctivity, the sample ﬁrms held a mean of 5.12 meetings in a year.
iven that the Good Governance Codes in Spain require a minimum
f four board meetings a year, the ﬁrms in the sample comply with
he rule.
According to board size, the mean value is 5 members per board,
hich is in line with corporate governance recommendations. It
eems that the boards of the ﬁrms in the sample are quite small.
inally, if we analyse the tenure of the CEO and directors, it is on
verage longer than 10 years (Table 2).
In relation to control variables, Table 1 shows the ﬁrms in the
ample have on average an age of 38 years, 43,493.66D  of total
ssets, their level of indebtedness is around 61% and their growth
pportunity is 4.56%.
Table 3 sets out the results of our regression evaluating the inﬂu-
nce of board composition on business performance for family and
on-family ﬁrms.
In our ﬁrst regression we examined the inﬂuence of outside
irectors on ﬁrm performance. As noted in Table 3 (column I),
he overall model is signiﬁcant (F statistic = 3.53; p < 0.01 and R2
s 0.11). The results were not expected. Our results show a sig-
iﬁcant negative relationship (ˇ1 = −0.259) between outsiders and
rm performance. Hypothesis 1 was not supported. This negative
elationship between the percentage of outsiders on the board and
rm performance are consistent with studies indicating that ﬁrms
ith a majority of board outside directors have poorer performance
Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996). These results appear
o contradict the assumption that outside directors have an impor-
ant monitoring, advising and networking function and in contrast
ustify the presence of insider directors in ﬁrms in the sample.The reasons put forward to explain the negative relation-
hip between the presence of outside directors and performance
ary. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) suggest that both inside and
utside directors may  fail to perform their job of representing y Economía de la Empresa 19 (2013) 127–135
shareholders’ interests properly, i.e., it cannot be concluded that
outsiders perform their activity better than insiders. Likewise,
inside directors offer advice and conveying knowledge to the CEO
on the ﬁrm’s day-to-day operations. The presence of insiders on the
board makes it easier for the other directors to view them as poten-
tial top executives, since they can assess their skills more simply
from seeing them act on the board itself (Bhagat & Black, 2000). It
also needs to be said that each type of director has a speciﬁc role
on the board (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Inside directors have a
greater knowledge of the ﬁrm than outsiders (Raheja, 2005), who
are often unfamiliar with the working of the ﬁrm. Outsiders’ inde-
pendence makes them quicker to react in a crisis situation, but they
have a greater chance of making mistakes as a result of that lack of
knowledge.
We analyse the effect of board size on ﬁrm performance in
column II and III (F statistic = 3.28; p < 0.01 and R2 is 0.11; F
statistic = 3.60; p < 0.01 and R2 is 0.11). We  expect a non-linear rela-
tionship between the two variables. Our results (column II) do not
show an optimal level of board size because the coefﬁcients of board
size and its square are not signiﬁcant (ˇ1 = −0.039 and ˇ2 = 0.006).
However, our ﬁndings (column III) show a signiﬁcant negative rela-
tionship between board size and ﬁrm performance (ˇ1 = −0.019).
The results support prior studies (De Andrés et al., 2005;
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996), and conﬁrm that small
boards of directors are more effective. Nevertheless, the results
contrast with the earlier work of García-Olalla and García-Ramos
(2010), Nicholson and Kiel (2007) and Van den Berghe and Levrau
(2004) who  ﬁnd that increasing the number of directors improves
ﬁrm performance. Our ﬁndings show, as indicated by Jensen
(1993), that the beneﬁts of an increase in size seem to be out-
weighed by the problems of poorer coordination, communication
and ﬂexibility that are associated with large boards.
The fourth regression (column IV, F statistic = 3.22; p < 0.01
and R2 is 0.10) analyse the relation between the board’s activity,
measured by the number of meetings per year, and ﬁrm perfor-
mance. We hypothesised a positive relationship between the two
variables, but the results do not show any signiﬁcant relationship
between the frequency of boards meetings and ﬁrm performance.
Although the sign of the coefﬁcient is positive as we expected
(ˇ1 = 0.001), its lack of signiﬁcance does not allow us to accept the
hypothesis 3. Another explanation for the insigniﬁcance of this
ﬁnding could be the more complex relationship between this two
variables or the possibility of a lag effect in that boards respond
to poor performance by increasing board activity which in turn
affects following years’ performance (Vafeas, 1999).
In relation with board activity, we can analyse other aspects,
such as how far in advance the directors receive the agenda and the
information needed to properly prepare the meetings. Therefore,
the analysis of this aspect will give an idea of whether the directors
have sufﬁcient time to analyse the material received and prepare
the meetings. Otherwise, these meetings can turn into purely infor-
mative, as the chairman set out the points of the day and directors
can hardly take part or exposed his points of view if they have not
had time to consider the information received. Most ﬁrms in the
sample give the information needed to prepare the meeting with
just less time than a week. With this information it seems that the
sample’s ﬁrm could have passive boards.
Regarding leadership structure, we analyse (column V) the rela-
tionship between the board leadership and ﬁrm performance. Our
ﬁndings (F statistic = 3.33; p < 0.01 and R2 is 0.10) do not show that
boards whose chairman is not a CEO performs signiﬁcantly bet-
ter than those whose chairman is also a CEO. The insigniﬁcance of
the duality variable (ˇ1 = 0.004) although no consistent with Coles,
McWilliams, and Sen (2001) and Peel and O’Donnell (1995) it is
consistent with prior ﬁndings of Daily and Dalton (1994), Vafeas
and Theodorou (1998), Elsayed (2007) and Jackling and Johl (2009).
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Table  2
Correlation data.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 ROA 1
2  Outsiders −0.10*** 1
3 Board size −0.09 0.13** 1
4  Meet −0.01 −0.06 −0.09 1
5  Leadership 0.03 −0.16* −0.15* −0.02 1
6  Tenure −0.15*** −0.04 0.05 −0.18** 0.08 1
7  Growth opportunity −0.15* 0.09 0.07 −0.02 0.04 0.04 1
8  Leverage −0.21* −0.05 0.01 0.04 −0.00 0.08 −0.06 1
9  Firm’s size 0.07 −0.03 0.15** −0.02 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.13** 1
10  Firm’s age −0.12** −0.01 −0.07 −0.01 −0.04 0.20** 0.05 0.03 −0.03 1
* Signiﬁcance at 10%.
** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 3
Relationship between the board composition and ﬁrms performance in family and non-family ﬁrms.
ROA
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Constante 0.093 0.108 0.910 0.072 0.064 −0.012 0.044 0.099
OUTSIDERS −0.259*** −0.015 −0.026**
BOARDSIZE −0.039 −0.019*** −0.027 −0.017**
BOARDSIZE2 0.006 0.005
MEET  0.001 −0.010 0.001
DUALITY 0.004 −0.003 −0.000
TENURE −0.013 −0.013
GROWTHOP −0.265* −0.271* 0.271* −0.279* −0.282* −0.323** −0.304** −0.260*
LEV −0.107* −0.107* −0.106* −0.106* −0.109* −0.161* −0.154* −0.112*
SIZE 0.007*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007*** 0.008** 0.014** 0.013** 0.009**
AGE −0.13*** −0.014*** −0.013* −0.012*** −0.014*** −0.008 −0.011 −0.015***
F value 3.53 3.28 3.60 3.22 3.33 3.41 2.18 3.04
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.25
*
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** Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1%.
hese results do not support the hypothesis 4 which postulate that
he separation of the ﬁgures of CEO and chairman is positively
ssociated with ﬁrm performance.
In the column VI we analyse the relation between the CEO and
irectors tenure and ﬁrm performance. In this case neither do we
nd any relationship between these two variables because the coef-
cient is not signiﬁcant (ˇ1 = −0.013). Although the coefﬁcient is
egative as we expected, it is no signiﬁcant, so we  cannot accept
ypothesis 5. The tenure on average is longer than 10 years, but it
eems that this aspect does not have any inﬂuence on ﬁrm perfor-
ance.
Finally we analyse the combined effect of all variables. Com-
aring models VII and VIII we can observe that the model is more
obust when we do not include the non-linear effect of board size
nd CEO tenure variables. This fact may  suggest that these variables
re not relevant for ﬁrm performance.
. Conclusion
This paper analyse the efﬁciency of the board of directors as a
orporate governance mechanism. For this purpose, we examine
he effect of board composition, size, activity, leadership structure
nd CEO tenure on ﬁrm performance. We  apply a cross-sectional
rdinary least-square (OLS) regression model to test the hypothe-
es presented. After testing the ﬁrst version of the model, which
ncludes just one variable (OUTSIDERS), we do seven more regres-
ions to take into account the composition of the board and its
unctioning. To test our hypothesis, contrary to most previous stud-
es, we did not focus on large listed companies but adopted a sample
f 307 Spanish SMEs, none of which is listed.Our main empirical result is the negative impact of the out-
side directors proportion and board size on ﬁrm performance. The
presence of outside directors can be said not to have resulted in
improved ﬁrm performance. Despite the greater monitoring, advis-
ing and networking capacity attributed to outside directors, the
ﬁrms in the sample showed a signiﬁcant presence of insider direc-
tors, an aspect that may  be related to their greater knowledge of the
ﬁrm, with a subsequently positive effect on strategic planning deci-
sions, which means a greater trust with inside directors in SMEs.
The negative effect of board size indicate that the disadvantages
of worse coordination, ﬂexibility and communication inside large
boards seem to be more important than the beneﬁts of better man-
ager control by the board of directors.
In sum, our ﬁndings, as well as the ones of García-Olalla
and García-Ramos (2010), contradict the widespread belief that
smaller, independent and proactive boards, as well as an effective
separation of the ﬁgures of the chairperson of the board and the
CEO, are always more effective.
Our research has some implications for SMEs and their advisors.
Our results show which is the most suitable structure for board of
directors in order to improve its performance. Besides, the ﬁnd-
ings show that outsiders do not add value to the ﬁrm, so we think
that the problem can be the criteria for choosing directors. Out-
sider selection is important because must give professionalism to
the board. Therefore, outside directors are to be selected carefully
in order to be adequately qualiﬁed to carry out the responsibilities.
Outsiders must have skills, experience in other ﬁrms, knowledge of
corporate management and economic independence on the com-
pensation they receive. It is also interesting that the consultants
recommend ﬁrms to have a well-balanced equilibrium between
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utside and inside directors because of the important and concrete
ole they play on it, exercising a more effective function on the
oard, leading to better performance.
This research has to deal with some limitations. First, our data
re cross-sectional in nature and therefore, we cannot clearly infer
n causality. Only a panel data sample will allow testing and com-
lementing our ﬁndings. Second, data were collected exclusively in
pain, therefore limiting the possibility of generalizing our ﬁndings.
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